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ABSTRACT
The use of smartphones as navigation devices has become more prevalent. The ubiquity of hand-
held navigation devices such as Garmins or Toms Toms has been falling whereas the ownership of
smartphones and their adoption as GPS devices is growing. This work provides a comprehensive
study of the most popular smartphone mapping applications, namely Google Maps, Apple Maps,
Waze, MapQuest, Bing, and Scout, on both Android and iOS. It details what data was found, where
it was found, and how it was acquired for each application. Based on the findings, the work allowed
for the construction of a tool capable of parsing the data from all of the aforementioned applications
as well as creating maps of the locations attained. It was discovered that much data relating to the
user’s navigation history, be it addresses, latitude longitude points, etc., were stored on the user’s
device. It was also found that in almost all cases, discerning whether the user had actually traveled
to a destination from the mapping application data was not possible.
Keywords: Mapping application forensics, iOS forensics, Android forensics, GPS forensics, Waze
forensics, Google Maps forensics, Apple Maps forensics, MapQuest forensics, Scout forensics, Bing
forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, global smartphone ownership reached
1.859 billion people. This is expected to rise to
over 2 billion by the end of 2016, and by the end
of 2018 smartphone penetration is projected to
increase to just over 36% of the global popula-
tion (2.48 billion users) (Statista, 2016). Smart-
phones have surpassed the ownership level of per-
sonal computers and have become a main ele-
ment of crime scene investigations (Umale, Desh-
mukh, & Tambhakhe, 2014). McMillan, Glis-
son, and Bromby (2013) conducted research in
the United Kingdom which illustrated the rise of
criminal activities involving smartphones at an
average rate of growth of ten cases per year from
2006 to 2011.
A segment of applications that has gone
largely unnoticed by the research community is
that of mapping applications. Paralleled with
the increase in smartphone adoption as naviga-
tion devices has been the decrease in the use
of hand-held navigation devices like Garmins
(Statista, 2012). In the United States alone,
Google Maps and Apple Maps, have 64.5 and 42
million users, respectively (Buczkowski, 2014),
while the remaining applications seen in Table 1
account for around a total of 50 million users
(Cohan, 2013). Worldwide, both Google Maps
(46.7%) and Apple Maps (26.2%) have signifi-
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cant penetration in the mobile domain (Statista,
2015).
The nature of mapping applications, navigat-
ing a user to a destination, directing users around
traffic, etc., makes them likely to hold data on
where the user has been, what time they were
there, their traveling tendencies, etc., some even
offer chatting services with other users (see Ta-
ble 2). It is apparent why data such as this may
be of importance to investigators and as such
is the reason for the examination of the highly
adopted mapping applications listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Tested applications
Application Android Vers. iOS Vers.
Google Maps 9.6.1 4.8.62649
Apple Maps NA 8.3
Waze 3.9.3.0 3.2.9.1
MapQuest 2.7.7 4.8
Bing Maps 5.2.0.20140710 5.4
Scout GPS 2.5.1.0021 2.1.1
At the time of writing this paper, literature
on the forensics of smartphone mapping applica-
tions was sparse. Our work aimed at filling the
gap in the scientific literature.
Our research informs practitioners, researchers
and the digital forensics community at large on
methods of extracting data from the applications
in Table 2. It identified the digital forensic arti-
facts that can be found by analyzing each of these
applications and resulted in a tool that can be
used to analyze potential digital evidence from
the applications.
Manual retrieval of data from these applica-
tions would take a considerable amount of time
and expertise. Not all of the files associated with
these applications can be opened and read by hu-
man eyes. Some files need to be decoded, some
have no structure making them difficult to follow,
and certain files contain data of interest which is
hidden amongst an immense amount of irrelevant
data.
Smart NAVigation Parser (SNAVP), the tool
constructed during this research (see Sec. 5),
combats all of these issues by i) outputting an
organized, searchable, sortable, and easy to read
Excel file where all of the data related to these
applications can be found ii) eliminating the need
to have a person with the expertise needed to
decode/translate certain files to a human read-
able format, and iii) removing the need for an
investigator to manually search through a de-
vice’s forensic image to locate and extract ev-
idence. The tool also contributes a framework
to the digital forensics community that can eas-
ily be built upon to include new versions of the
tested applications as well as any new mapping
applications released in the future.
In the remainder of the paper we first discuss
related work in Sec. 2. We then describe our
methodology in Sec. 3. We later share our find-
ings of the artifacts found from the various map-
ping applications in Sec. 4. The constructed ex-
tensible SNAVP tool is then described in Sec. 5.
We lastly present future work and limitations in
Sec. 6 and conclusions in Sec. 7.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Hand-held satellite navigation
devices
Research has been conducted in the area of
hand-held satellite navigation devices such as
Garmins, TomToms, and Magellans (Van Eijk
& Roeloffs, 2010; Arbelet, 2014). Past work il-
lustrated the importance of the digital evidence
that could be extracted from these devices such
as where the user has been, how they got there,
who owns them, favorite addresses, etc. (Last,
2009). Evidence such as this may lead to a
number of important discoveries during investi-
gations including behavioral profiles of those who
have used the device (Colombini, Colella, Cas-
tiglione, & Scognamiglio, 2012).
Notwithstanding, satellite navigation devices
are being replaced by smartphone mapping ap-
plications. Garmin reported a company worth
less than a third of its value in 2007 as well a 15
percent reduction in sales in 2013 (Leber, 2013).
Much of this drop was accredited to the increas-
ing ubiquity of smartphones and the usage of the
mapping applications on them replacing Global
Positioning System (GPS) devices.
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Table 2: Application features
Application Navigation Directions Chatting ETA Home/Work Address Favorites Location Sharing
Google Maps X X - - X X -
Apple Maps X X - - - X -
Waze X X X X X - X
MapQuest X X - - X - -
Bing Maps - X - - - - -
Scout GPS X X X X X X -
2.2 Mobile phone forensics
McMillan et al. (2013) conducted a survey which
found that calls and Short Message Service
(SMS) data held the most evidential importance
during investigations, however, user and applica-
tion data were also found to be of high impor-
tance. Much of the work in the mobile forensics
domain has focused on discovering these types of
data on various Operating Systems (Hoog, 2011;
Casey, Bann, & Doyle, 2010; Sima˜o, S´ıcoli, Melo,
Deus, & Sousa Ju´nior, 2011).
For instance, Al Mutawa, Baggili, and Mar-
rington (2012) investigated the forensic arti-
facts that could be extracted from different so-
cial media applications such as Facebook, Twit-
ter and MySpace. Furthermore, researchers
such as Mahajan, Dahiya, and Sanghvi (2013)
and Thing, Ng, and Chang (2010) examined
what digital forensic artifacts could be recov-
ered from different messaging services and ap-
plications such as WhatsApp and Viber. Newer
studies focused on examining the network foren-
sic implications of similar social-messaging appli-
cations (Karpisek, Baggili, & Breitinger, 2015;
Walnycky, Baggili, Marrington, Moore, & Bre-
itinger, 2015).
Maus, Ho¨fken, and Schuba (2011) conducted
a study concerning geodata on Android phones
where they used geodata from all applications on
a device which stored location data in an attempt
to provide the investigator with a viewable map
of where the user had been.
However, retrieving data from mobile devices
has comes with several challenges for researchers
and investigators (Bennett, 2012). The na-
ture of smartphones, the Central Processing
Unit (CPU) architecture, their processing and
memory resources, as well as the sheer num-
ber of used Operating Systems (OS), severely
complicates the forensic acquisition and analy-
sis of these devices (Barmpatsalou, Damopoulos,
Kambourakis, & Katos, 2013).
The process gets more complex when one takes
into account the high rate of change in the mobile
field (new applications, application versions, OS
versions, etc.), the number of different devices
that are in use, and the lack of software, hard-
ware and interface standardization (Lessard &
Kessler, 2010; Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007).
Casey and Stellatos (2008) also noted that en-
cryption of the data on these devices is becom-
ing more prevalent having notable implications
on digital forensic investigations. These chal-
lenges present investigators and researchers with
a difficult task whenever a mobile device is being
examined.
2.2.1 Android forensics
The challenges posed by Android devices stem
from the wide array of versions the platform sup-
ports. Many developers and companies put their
own twist on the platform when releasing their
devices leading to every device/Android version
combination to possess unique characteristics. A
minor difference in the Android version may re-
quire extensive testing and validation of tools be-
fore they can be deemed forensically sound on a
given system (Hoog, 2011).
Android forensics is an active area of re-
search. For example, Vidas, Zhang, and Christin
(2011) focused on developing a general collection
methodology for the vast amount of Android de-
vices. Distefano, Me, and Pace (2010), however,
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focused on discovering different anti-forensic
methods used on Android devices. Albano, Cas-
tiglione, Cattaneo, and De Santis (2011) devel-
oped a technique that provided the ability to
modify and erase, securely and selectively, dig-
ital evidence on an Android device using simple
software tools that are commonly seen on *nix-
like operating systems such as Android.
The analysis of phone memory has also been
of importance to Android forensics as valuable
data such as passwords, text messages, etc. may
be contained within the memory (Thing et al.,
2010). Many tools have been created to aid in
this process.
Several plugins for Volatility – an advanced
memory forensics framework – were created to
read data such as passwords, chat messages, user
names, and e-mail (Macht, 2013). Sylve, Case,
Marziale, and Richard (2012) designed a kernel
module for dumping memory that addressed the
difficulties in developing device-independent ac-
quisition tools while Leppert (2012) focused on
acquiring and analyzing heap-dumps of Android
applications.
2.2.2 iOS forensics
Breaking the security barriers of the newer ver-
sions of iOS devices so that physical images may
be acquired without jailbreaking the device has
become increasingly difficult (Belenko & Skl-
yarov, 2011). Jailbreaking involves removing re-
strictions on the device so that a physical im-
age may be acquired, however, this process al-
ters data on the device itself possibly tainting
its forensic value. One would have to know that
none of the user data was altered and that the
exact alteration of any other data on the device
be known for an acquisition method to be con-
sidered forensically sound.
The difficulty of acquiring a physical image of
an iOS device has made other extraction meth-
ods more prominent when dealing with newer
iOS devices. A common approach leverages
the iPhone backup files created with the iTunes
backup utility (Bader & Baggili, 2010; Morrissey
& Campbell, 2010). This method only acquires
data that has been synchronized by the backup
protocol, but as stated by Hoog and Strzempka
(2011) most of the allocated data can be re-
trieved using this method. This method was de-
termined to be the premier method for logical
acquisition for iOS devices (Tso, Wang, Huang,
& Wang, 2012). Another often used approach is
logical extraction. This procedure extracts ac-
tive folders and files directly from the iPhone,
but does not retrieve any data from the unallo-
cated space.
3. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this research followed
the guidelines for forensically examining artifacts
presented by NIST (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, &
Dang, 2006). The smartphones that were used
in our examination were a Samsung S4 Active
(SGH-i537) running Android version 4.4.2 and
an iPhone 4s Model A1387 running iOS 8.2. To-
wards the end of the research, the Samsung S4
Active stopped turning on and could no longer
be used, therefore, a Samsung Galaxy S4 Zoom
(SM-C101) running Android version 4.4.2 was
used when investigating Google Maps and Bing.
Our research methodology was broken into
three phases data creation and acquisition
(Sec. 3.1), data analysis (Sec. 3.2), and tool cre-
ation (Sec. 3.3). The high level methodology is
portrayed in Fig. 1.
3.1 Phase I: data creation and
acquisition
Several actions were performed on each applica-
tion. These actions were chosen based on the fea-
tures of each application shown in Table 2. Each
action was recorded and logged so that any data
on the mobile device resulting from the given ac-
tion could be discerned.
The devices were acquired using .XRY 1. .XRY
is software which forensically extracts data from
a variety of mobile devices. A device image was
acquired after each entry shown in Table 3. The
Samsung S4 Active and the Samsung Galaxy S4
Zoom were physically acquired, while all of the
images of the iPhone 4S were logical due to phys-
ical acquisition of the iPhone 4s not being sup-
1Micro Systemation AB (MSAB), https://www.msab
.com/, last accessed 2015-09-29
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Figure 1: High level methodology for Android
and iOS
ported by any tools at the time of conducting the
acquisition.
We note that although we used different ac-
quisition methods on the devices, our work’s
scope focused on the allocated space, making
the method of extraction not as significant as
it would be had any of the data discovered was
found in unallocated space.
3.2 Phase II: data analysis
Analysis of the acquired forensic images was
completed using a variety of tools. .XRY and
Cellebrite were used to mount and explore the
acquired images to discover files related to the
tested applications.
Once files were identified, several tools were
utilized to inspect the file contents. WinHex 2, a
universal hexidecimal editor, was used to identify
file headers and inspect the content of files that
2http://www.x-ways.net/winhex/, last accessed
2015-11-23
Table 3: Actions performed
# Recorded action
1 A fresh install of the application
2 A location was inserted into the appli-
cation and traveled to
3 A location was inserted into the appli-
cation and not traveled to
4 Application specific features such as
sending messages, sharing locations,
etc.
were not recognized by .XRY.
DB Browser for SQLite3 is a visual open source
tool that allows for the creation, design, editing,
and viewing of database files that are compatible
with SQLite. This tool was used to explore the
contents of any SQlite database encountered.
XML files were inspected with Sublime Text, a
text editor for code, markup, and prose 4, while
any binary plist files encountered were inspected
using a combination of Xcode 7, a powerful IDE
5, and the Terminal.
3.3 Phase III: Smart Navigation
Parser (SNAVP)
SNAVP, the tool created during this research was
designed to parse out as much of the data as pos-
sible that was found based on our findings. It
was designed as a command line tool with mod-
ularity and extensiblity in mind so that addi-
tional parsers may be added it to it at any time.
SNAVP is discussed in further detail in Sec. 5.
4. RESULTS
This section describes the results of the artifacts
found in detail. For a summary of the artifacts
found, refer to Table 5 and Table 6.
3http://sqlitebrowser.org/, last accessed 2015-12-
09
4http://www.sublimetext.com/, last accessed 2015-
12-07
5https://developer.apple.com/xcode/, last ac-
cessed 2015-11-20
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4.1 Google Maps - Android
Google Maps contained four files of evidentiary
value: da destination history, search history.db,
com.google.android.apps.maps preferences.xml,
and DATA SYNC DATA.
da destination history was a SQLite database
file that contained location data related to the
starting and ending locations that the user se-
lected to retrieve directions to. In order for data
to be present in this database the user had to
have selected navigate after entering in locations.
search history.db, another SQLite database,
held the user’s search data. This meant that
navigation was not necessary for data to appear
in this database, the data was entered as soon as
the user searched for any location within Google
Maps.
com.google.android.apps.maps preferences.xml
was an XML file that contained the user’s
preferences and more specifically the last user
account name to use Google Maps.
DATA SYNC DATA contained cloud data
based on the user account that was using the
application. So, for example, if a user had saved
a search using a different device, that location
would be found in this file so that it could be
used on any device as long as the user was signed
into Google Maps.
4.2 Google Maps - iOS
No data that related to the user’s searches, nav-
igation, or saved locations were found on the
iPhone, however, the file com.google.Maps.plist
did include the user’s last known location along
with what seemed to be other files of interest. In
com.google.Maps.plist was a reference to a plist
file called 1436530344726.plist. The name of the
plist file, 1436530344726, was in the form of a
Unix timestamp that converted to July 10, 8:12
AM EST, the time at which the last search oc-
curred while using Google Maps.
4.3 Apple Maps
Only one file, GeoHistory.mapsdata, was found
to contain data related to the user’s actions in
Apple Maps. GeoHistory.mapsdata was a plist
file that held data pertaining to what the user
had searched for within the application as well as
Yelp reviews for the given locations if applicable.
4.4 Waze - Android
The files waze log.txt, user.db, tiles nt.db, and
tts.db were found to hold data related to the
user’s activity while using the Waze application.
waze log.txt contained an immense amount of
data. The file was separated into active sessions
which were defined as the time from when the
user had opened the Waze application to when
they closed out of it. Three different actions
were found to cause a RoutingRequest within this
file i) when a route was requested by the user
ii) when GPS signal was lost and then found
again during navigation, and iii) when rerouting
occurred during navigation. A RoutingRequest
contained a starting and ending location in the
form of latitude and longitude points for the re-
quested route, and the two lines directly above
each RoutingRequest contained a timestamp and
current location of the user.
user.db was a SQLite database that contained
a plethora of data including the destination the
user had received directions to, the time at which
the directions were requested, and the Estimated
Time of Arrivals (ETAs) that were sent or re-
ceived. It is critical to note that the data men-
tioned appeared in the database at the time nav-
igation was selected within Waze; meaning that
there was no way to discern whether the user had
actually traveled to the destination form the data
found in this database.
tiles nt.db was a SQLite database that con-
tained data which related to images of the pieces
of maps that were needed for navigation sessions.
An approach to relate the entries in this database
to the many locations that were navigated to was
not discovered and warrants future research.
tts.db was another SQLite database. It held
paths to the audio direction files that were used
during navigation, i.e. turn right, continue
straight, etc. However, a way to link the entries
in this table to specific navigation sessions was
not found.
Waze uniquely had the feature of sending and
receiving messages to other users. The messages
that were sent and received were not found on
the device, however, prior research by Storozuk
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(2014) found that the messages could be found
in the device’s memory.
4.5 Waze - iOS
The only file found on the logical image of the
iPhone was user.db. This SQLite database had
the exact same structure and data as its Android
counterpart (see Sec. 4.4).
4.6 MapQuest - Android
A SQLite database named search.db contained
all of the data pertaining to the places that the
user navigated to while using MapQuest. Three
fields within the search table were found to hold
the most importance in this research.
Two fields contained UNIX timestamps. The
ctime field referred to when the user had
searched for directions, while the atime field re-
ferred to the time that MapQuest actually re-
trieved the directions that were queried.
The third field was titled json and was a json
field that contained the address and longitude
and latitude coordinates of the destination along
with a userInput key that held the text that the
user had actually searched for.
4.7 MapQuest - iOS
The data that related to the user’s navigation
history while using MapQuest was found in the
file com.aol.mapquest.plist. This plist file con-
tained data such as latitude and longitude co-
ordinates and addresses of destinations searched
for or marked as a favorite by the user. How-
ever, there were no timestamps associated with
these entries and the data structure was the same
whether the destination was actually traveled to
or not.
4.8 Bing Maps
Bing Maps was unique in that it was not a stand
alone mapping application; the Bing Maps seg-
ment was just a part of the overall Bing appli-
cation. As the purpose of this research was to
test mapping applications, only the Bing Maps
portion of the application was tested. Further,
Bing had the option to search privately, and if
the user was in private mode, Bing claimed that
the users search history would not be stored by
the application.
4.8.1 Bing Maps - Android
A single SQLite database file, SearchHistory-
Database.db, held the user’s search history when
private browsing was not enabled. It had a sim-
ple structure of three tables with the table of in-
terest being SearchHistory. The NAME field in
this table referred to the text that was searched
for and the LAST field correlated with the time
that the search occurred.
4.8.2 Bing Maps - iOS
The iOS version of Bing was found to hold sev-
eral files that contained data regarding the ac-
tions performed by the user, a History.plist file
along with multiple *.dat files.
History.plist contained the search history of
the user as long as private searching was not en-
abled. Any search that occurred while private
searching was enabled did not result in an en-
try in Historys.plist. For an entry to be made
here, the location had to be searched for using
the search bar of the Bing Maps application. If
the “get directions” icon was pressed prior to
searching for a location then that location would
not appear in Historys.plist.
The *.dat files, where the * represents an inte-
ger value, were found at two locations. The non-
private version of the *.dat file was stored in the
Documents/Journal directory. This directory
did not exist until a search had occurred within
the application, while the private version of these
files were stored in the Documents/PriJournal
directory, and similar to the non-private version,
the PriJournal directory did not exist until a
search had occurred when privacy was enabled.
It was found that the highest numbered *.dat
file contained data on the most recent location
that was searched by the user, with or without
private browsing enabled.
4.9 Scout - Android
Two files were found which contained data
deemed of evidentiary value, a SQLite database
named scoutAppDatabase.db and an XML file ti-
tled Route *.
scoutAppDatabase.db contained eight tables
that held data pertaining to the user’s actions
while using Scout. This included members of
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chat sessions, the messages themselves, config-
uration data, the address along with the longi-
tude and latitude coordinates of locations that
were navigated to, and usernames of friends of
the user.
A different Route * file was created each time
a location was navigated to where the * was re-
placed by the UNIX timestamp of when the nav-
igation session was first created. Within the file
was detailed information about every route that
was offered to the user for a given destination
and also specified the exact route that the user
had chosen. Each route was broken up into seg-
ments, thereby allowing one to reconstruct each
given route by combining their respective seg-
ments.
Unfortunately, in both files, the location data
was created at the time that navigation was re-
quested, making it difficult to discern whether
the user had actually traveled to the destination.
4.10 Scout - iOS
Only one plist file, namely
com.telenav.scout.push store.log was found
to hold data related to user’s navigation, how-
ever, the data within this file was incomplete.
For example, the file held the UNIX timestamp
of when the navigation was started and only
the final direction of the navigation session, i.e.
in one of the test scenarios, the only direction
found was “Turn left to Ruden St” (the final
direction before the user would reach their
actual destination). Because of this, the se-
quence of actions performed on the iOS device
were completed several times as to ensure that
the lack of data was not caused by an error,
but still, only incomplete data was found in
com.telenav.scout.pushstore.log.
Our findings helped us construct the basis for
a parser for all of these applications which we
discuss in the Sec. 5 that follows.
5. SMART NAVIGATION
PARSER (SNAVP)
In its initial release, SNAVP was designed as a
command line tool that took one required pa-
rameter and one optional parameter. The re-
quired parameter was signified by a -i and took
the location of the input, i.e. a file, a directory,
a device image, a zip file etc., as an argument.
The optional parameter was signified by a -o and
was the location where the program would write
its output to. If no argument was provided for
the output location, the output defaulted to the
current working directory.
After the input was received, the program pro-
ceeded to determine the nature of the input, i.e.
whether it is a tar file, an image file, a single file,
or a directory. The type of input determined the
next steps, a tar file would have to be unpacked,
an image would have have to be mounted, etc.,
however, we note that not all image files were
mountable (see Sec. 6). Each file in the input
was then iterated over and had its file header or
extension checked to determine if it was a file of
interest.
A file of interest was defined as a binary plist
(bplist), a sqlite database, a text file, or an XML
file. These were all of the file types from the
tested applications that were found to hold digi-
tal evidence of forensic value. If a file was of in-
terest, the parsers would run their validity check
against the file, and if passed, the parser would
then parse the file and send the parsed data back
to the main program where it would be written
out to an Excel file.
The first sheet of every Excel file, titled
Parsers Ran (see Figure 2), lists the parsers that
were run on the input given, provide the file path
to the file that they were run on and the color
of the marks for each respective application that
can be seen on the All Applications Map (Fig-
ure 3). The data retrieved from each individual
parser was contained on its own respective sheet
within the created Excel document.
5.1 Program structure
The first file shown in Figure 4 is ParseCon-
trol.py. This file controlled the overall program.
It received the user’s input, ran the necessary
parsers, collected the data, created the map files,
and wrote it all out to an Excel file.
The Dependencies folder contained three key
elements of SNAVP. FileCheck.py determined
whether or not a given file was of the type txt,
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Figure 2: First sheet of SNAVP output
Figure 3: All applications map
sqlite, plist, or xml. This was determined by
using the file header and/or the file extension.
The action of Mount.py is determined by the in-
put that was given. If the input was an image
file, Mount.py would attempt to mount the file
so that its contents could be read. If the input
was a tar or zip file, it would extract the data
to a given folder so that it may be read, etc.
WorksheetData.py contained the WorksheetData
class. This class was used to store the data from
the individual parsers in a manner that ParseC-
ontrol.py could interpret.
The Parsers folder contained all of the indi-
vidual parsers that could be executed. As men-
tioned in Sec. 3.3, SNAVP was designed in a
modular manner. To add a new parser to the
tool, one would only have to add the parser file
to this folder, and add the file name to the init.py
file. As long as the parser created followed the
WorksheetData class, it would be correctly inte-
Figure 4: SNAVP structure
grated into SNAVP.
5.2 Dependencies
• The Sleuth Kit - is a C library along with
a collection of command line tools that al-
low the analysis of disk images. Many tools,
such as Autopsy, use The Sleuth Kit behind
the scenes 6. SNAVP used The Sleuth Kit
to mount image files and extract files of in-
6The Sleuth Kit (TSK), http://www.sleuthkit.org/,
last accessed 2015-09-29
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terest so that they may be parsed.
• pytsk3 - is a Python package that is a
Python binding for The Sleuth Kit 7. This
allowed SNAVP to programmatically mount
images so that they could be searched to de-
termine if any files of interest resided on the
image. Those files were then extracted and
parsed if applicable.
• pygmaps - is another Python package that is
a Python wrapper for Google Maps 8. This
provided SNAVP with the capability to gen-
erate HTML files that plot given coordinates
on Google Maps.
• ccl-bplist - is a Python module that helps
deal with binary plist files (bplists) 9.
SNAVP utilized this module when attempt-
ing to parse any bplists that it encountered.
• XlsxWriter - is a Python module that al-
lowed the creation of Excel XLSX files 10.
This module was used to organize and pro-
duce the parsed data into an Excel work-
book in a meaningful manner.
6. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE
WORK
The rate at which new versions of applications
are released is overwhelming. SNAVP was tested
on the specific application versions shown in Ta-
ble 1. This does not mean it will not work on
other versions, however, it is possible that new
and old versions of these applications have dif-
ferent file names, schemas for their files, etc. To
combat this challenge SNAVP was created in a
modular manner so that new parsers may be
added to support any new or old versions of the
tested applications as well as any additional GPS
applications.
7pytsk3, https://github.com/py4n6/pytsk, last ac-
cessed 2015-09-29
8pygmaps, https://code.google.com/p/pygmaps/,
last accessed 2015-09-29
9ccl-bplist, https://code.google.com/p/
ccl-bplist/, last accessed 2015-09-29
10XlsxWriter, http://xlsxwriter.readthedocs.org/,
last accessed 2015-09-29
It is also important to note that the data that
all of these applications were tested with was
minimal in comparison to real data. The tool
may error out on larger sets of data as not all pos-
sibilities could be accounted for with such small
sets of test data.
When a device image file was used as input,
not all of the images were mountable. For exam-
ple, .XRY used a proprietary file type .xry that
caused the program to error out when attempt-
ing to mount the image. Therefore, any image
file that could not be mounted resulted in the
user having to manually locate and extract the
files of interest, then use the directory that the
files were placed in as the input to the tool.
All of the latitude longitude points mapped
by SNAVP were only accurate within the United
States. Many of the applications did not put
the decimal point in the latitude or longitude
coordinate when it was saved; SNAVP had to
perform this action. The decimal points vary in
location depending on the actual latitude or lon-
gitude, therefore, the tool only guaranteed accu-
racy when it placed the decimal point for loca-
tions that were in the United States.
7. CONCLUSION
An immense amount of potential digital evidence
related to the examined applications were dis-
covered during this research (summarized in Ta-
ble 5 and Table 6). This data could hold great
evidentiary value during different types of inves-
tigations. The timestamps combined with the
current locations in Waze can place users in cer-
tain vicinities at certain times thereby corrobo-
rating a story or an alibi. Knowing the route
that a user had taken (data from the Scout ap-
plication) can be used to locate evidence the sus-
pect may have dropped along a route or locate
cameras that may be used to track a suspect.
Table 4 rates the tested applications, 1 being
highest and 10 being lowest, on the determined
forensic value that they hold. The rankings are
relative to each other and are a reflection on
the amount and the type of data that was as-
certained from each application during this re-
search. It is important to note that none of the
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data mentioned in this work was found in unal-
located space on the devices.
Table 4: Determined forensic value ranking of
applications
Forensic value Application
1 Waze (Android)
2 Scout (Android)
3 Google Maps (Android)
4 Waze (iOS)
5 MapQuest (Android)
6 Bing (iOS)
7 MapQuest (iOS)
8 Apple Maps
9 Google Maps (iOS)
10 Scout (iOS)
The Android version of Waze topped the list.
In addition to the starting and ending naviga-
tional points, it was found to periodically store
the current location of the user. Scout for An-
droid was next, it was found to store all of the
routes given to the user for a navigation session
along with the route that was chosen by the user.
It also contained messages that were sent be-
tween users on the application. Google Maps was
ranked third because it stored the starting and
ending location of provided routes. Only the top
rated applications provided a starting location.
Applications ranked 4 through 6 were all sim-
ilar as they provided data about the locations
that were searched for or navigated to. Notwith-
standing, they did not provide starting locations.
MapQuest for iOS and Apple Maps were ranked
7th and 8th respectively. They both provided
data on the user’s search and navigation history
but they did not store any timestamps with the
data making it difficult to determine a timeline
for the user. Google Maps for iOS ranked slightly
ahead of Scout due to being able to determine the
user’s last location right before exiting Google
Maps. The iOS version of Scout came in last
as almost no data that related to the locations
searched for or navigated to were found on the
device. Note that the Android version of Bing is
not listed in Table 4 since it could not be fully
examined during this research.
The downfall to the data that was found on
the devices was that actual travel was never re-
quired for data to be saved. Most of the tested
applications stored their data when it was either
searched for or navigated to. This could hurt
cases as the user cannot be placed at a particu-
lar point or on a particular route without some
other form of corroborating evidence. Again, the
Android version of Waze was the only application
that was found to store the user’s current loca-
tion at different times; this data was found in
Waze’s log file. To combat this challenge, future
work could attempt to correlate GPS locations
from multiple devices, as well as GPS log data
from the OS with the ones found from the stud-
ied applications.
As mentioned in Sec. 2, valuable data was
found on handheld navigation devices such as
TomToms and Magellans. In fact, the data found
was very similar to that which was found in this
study. As with the data found on the smart-
phones, data such as locations entered to, home,
work, and favorite addresses could be found on
handheld navigation devices, however, there was
one immense benefit gained from the data found
on handheld navigation devices as opposed to
the data found on smartphones. With handheld
navigation devices one was able to differentiate
whether a location in the GPS was actually trav-
eled to (Nutter, 2008).
Although being able to differentiate between
these two circumstances may be of importance,
the rest of the mapping data found on the smart-
phones was decidedly similar to that found on
handheld navigation devices. Thus, as it has
been discussed by Strawn (2009) that GPS de-
vices have helped prosecutors win cases, one may
argue that the mapping data found on the smart-
phones during this research would still be of
paramount importance during investigations.
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Table 5: Android - summary of results
Application File Description
Google Maps da destination history SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations that oc-
curred within Google Maps
Google Maps search history.db SQLite database that contained
data related to searches that oc-
curred within Google Maps
Google Maps DATA SYNC DATA Contained data from the user’s ac-
count that did not take place on the
given device or took place prior to
Google Maps being uninstalled
Waze waze log.txt Text file that contained location
data related to routes selected by
the user and their current locations
Waze user.db SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations selected
by the user
MapQuest search.db SQLite database that contained
data related to the navigation his-
tory of the user
Bing SearchHistoryDatabase.dbSQLite database that contained
user search history when private
browsing was disabled
Scout scoutAppDatabase.db SQLite database that contained
navigation and messaging data re-
lated to the user
Scout Route * XML file that contained the differ-
ent routes for navigation sessions,
the * represented the unix times-
tamp of the start of the respective
navigation session
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Table 6: iOS - summary of results
Application File Description
Apple Maps GeoHistory.mapsdata Plist file that contained data related
to the user’s search history
Waze user.db SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations selected
by the user
MapQuest com.aol.mapquest.plist Plist file that contained navigation
data relating to the user
Bing Historys.plist Plist file that contained data that
pertained to user searches
Bing *.dat (Non-private browsing) Plist file that contained data on the
most recent search, the * repre-
sented an integer value
Bing *.dat (Private browsing) Plist file that contained data on the
most recent private search, the *
represented an integer value
Scout com.telenav.scout.pushstore.log Plist file that contained incomplete
navigational data
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